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Abstract 
Since passage of the federal No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) in 2002, state 
departments of education across the U.S. have been busy creating or modifying 
school accountability systems to meet NCLB guidelines. Ultimately, NCLB seeks to 
have all public school students proficient in English/Language Arts and 
mathematics by 2014. To identify schools in danger of not meeting this goal, states 
must establish student performance benchmarks and identify schools not making 
adequate yearly progress (AYP). Those consistently failing to make AYP can be 
ordered into “radical restructuring,” which may include having the state intervene 
in running the school (U. S. Department of Education, 2002). Given these NCLB 
provisions and the growing number of schools not meeting AYP, the number of 
state interventions in low-performing schools will certainly increase. Accordingly, 
this article explores two questions about state-led interventions. First, how have 
teachers and administrators in underperforming schools in Massachusetts perceived 
state intervention? In addition, based on their perceptions, what might be done to 
make the process more effective? At three schools that experienced interventions 
from the Massachusetts Department of Education, a qualitative study explored the 
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process of state intervention. A survey to principals in 22 of the 23 schools deemed 
underperforming by the state between 2000 and 2004 supplemented the in-depth 
qualitative work. Drawing on these mixed methods data sources, this article offers 
a series of proposals aimed at informing future state interventions in Massachusetts 
and elsewhere.  
Key words: accountability; educational improvement; educational legislation; No 
Child Left Behind; politics of education; Massachusetts. 
El impacto de la intervención del Estado en escuelas de bajo desempeño en 
Massachusetts: Implicaciones políticas y practicas. 
Resumen 
Desde la aprobación en 2002 de la ley federal No Child Left Behind (NCLB/ 
Ningún Niño Se Quede Atrás), los departamentos estatales de educación. se han 
ocupado de crear o modificar sus sistemas de rendición de cuentas (accountability) 
para atender a las demandas de la ley NCLB. En última instancia, NCLB pide que 
todos los estudiantes de las escuelas públicas demuestren ser competentes en 
Inglés/Artes del Lenguaje y Matemáticas para el año 2014. Para identificar las 
escuelas que podrían no cumplir con este objetivo, los estados deben establecer 
indicadores de rendimiento de los estudiantes e identificar parámetros de referencia 
de “Progreso Anual Adecuado” para cada escuela. Escuelas que no demuestran 
tener un Progreso Anual Adecuado pueden ser sometidas a procesos de 
“Reestructuración radical”, que incluyen que el Departamento de Educación del 
Estado intervenga en la dirección de la escuela (Departamento de Educación, 
EE.UU., 2002). Teniendo en cuenta estas disposiciones y el creciente número de 
instituciones que no cumplen con los objetivos de Progreso Anual Adecuado, el 
número de intervenciones en escuelas con bajo desempeño va aumentar. En 
consecuencia, este artículo explora dos preguntas sobre esas intervenciones. En 
primer lugar, ¿cómo han percibido los maestros y administradores de escuelas de 
bajo rendimiento en Massachusetts la intervención del estatal? Además, sobre la 
base de esas percepciones, que se podría hacer para que el proceso de intervención 
sea más eficaz? Para contestar estas preguntas se realizo un estudio cualitativo en 
tres escuelas que experimentaron intervenciones del Departamento de Educación 
de Massachusetts. Para complementar los datos cualitativos se utilizó una encuesta 
con directores de 22 de las 23 escuelas consideradas de bajo rendimiento en 
Massachusetts (entre el 2000 y el 2004). En base a la combinación de datos y 
métodos de análisis, este artículo ofrece una serie de propuestas para futuras 
intervenciones escolares estatales en Massachusetts y en otros lugares.  
Palabras clave: rendición de cuentas; mejoramiento educativo; legislación educativa; 
Ningún Niño Se Quede Atrás (NCLB); políticas educativas; Massachusetts.  
 
Introduction 
Since passage of the federal No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) in 2002, state departments of 
education (DOE) across the country have been busy creating or modifying public school 
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accountability systems to meet NCLB guidelines, with the ultimate goals of having all public school 
students proficient in English/language arts and mathematics by 2014. Central to NCLB mandates is 
that states establish student performance benchmarks and identify schools not making adequate 
yearly progress (AYP), with proficiency judged through state-specific assessments. Schools that fail 
to make AYP for two consecutive years are designated as in need of improvement. Those failing to 
do so for four consecutive years may be referred for various corrective actions. After five years of 
not making AYP, schools may be ordered into radical restructuring—they may be converted into a 
charter school, a private company may take over the school, or the state may assume responsibility 
for running the school (U.S. Department of Education, 2002). Given these NCLB mandates in 
combination with trends in AYP data, it is virtually certain that state interventions in low-performing 
schools will increase nationwide (Brady, 2003; Elmore, 2003; Seder, 2000; Tucker & Toch, 2004; 
Ziebarth, 2004). 
In Massachusetts, state involvement in public school accountability predates NCLB. 
Although the State implemented its current accountability system in 1999, the first state intervention 
occurred in 1988 when, under state direction, Boston University assumed control of Chelsea public 
schools (Arasim, 1999).1 In 2000, the Massachusetts Department of Education (MADOE) initiated 
the panel review process, the first step in identifying schools as underperforming, and started 
reviewing and intervening in low-performing schools. From 2000 to 2004, MADOE organized 77 
panels of school teachers, administrators, and state education officials to intervene in schools 
identified as potentially underperforming2 due to low scores on the state-wide assessment, the 
Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS). Also, in 2004 the state declared the two 
districts of Winchendon and Holyoke underperforming, thus making all schools underperforming in 
those districts. In this instance, unlike Chelsea, the state initiated intervention and subsequent 
reforms.3  
The 77 schools in which MADOE intervened between 2000 and 2004 share many 
characteristics. All are urban. All serve disproportionate numbers of low-income, minority, English 
language learners (ELL), and immigrant students. Of the 77 schools that underwent panel review 
between 2000 and 2004, 23 were officially declared underperforming. MCAS results of schools 
reviewed but not declared underperforming, in most instances, were very low but did not differ 
significantly from those that were declared underperforming.  
Being one of the first states to have its NCLB accountability plan approved by federal 
officials (Education Commission of the States, n.d.),  Massachusetts represents a pioneer in public 
school accountability. In light of the coming wave of public school interventions aimed at enhancing 
student achievement, this study seeks to contribute to the emerging body of knowledge on state-led 
intervention in low-performing schools by exploring two questions: How do teachers and 
                                                 
1 We excluded these schools from our analyses because Chelsea is run entirely by Boston University, 
so the intervention is not being implemented by MADOE. 
2 Because a school can only be designated underperforming after a panel review, in Massachusetts the 
term is only used to refer to such schools. In this article, we adhere to the convention. Nonetheless, ‘state 
intervention’ includes not only work done in underperforming schools but the initial panel review process as 
well.  
3 The Massachusetts Accountability System and NCLB differ slightly. In Massachusetts, schools are 
deemed underperforming following aggregate-level analyses of several performance indicators and a site visit 
by a panel of educators and MADOE officials. Under NCLB, a school’s needed level of intervention is 
determined by failure to make AYP in multiple consecutive years in the aggregate and by sub-groups. NCLB 
includes no site visits. Massachusetts is currently redesigning its accountability system to align with NCLB 
requirements. 
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administrators in Massachusetts public schools perceive state intervention at their schools? And 
based on their perceptions, what might be done to make the intervention process more effective?  
To investigate these questions, we conducted qualitative studies at three secondary schools,  
one high school and two middle schools,  which underwent panel review and were reviewed by 
MADOE as potentially underperforming,. Ultimately, two were declared underperforming; one was 
not. To complement these qualitative studies we surveyed principals in 22 of the 23 schools declared 
underperforming between 2000 and 2004 by the state. Ideally, insights derived from this research 
will inform future interventions by state officials working with consistently low-performing schools.  
The State of State Interventions 
For a host of reasons, at this juncture in the ever-evolving arena of educational reform policy 
it is critical to understand how teachers and administrators in Massachusetts schools perceived state 
intervention. Since NCLB provisions mandate that state departments of education intervene in 
schools that consistently fail to achieve AYP,  many states face a new challenge: working to enhance 
academic achievement in chronically low-performing schools. As Reville, Coggins, Schaefer, and 
Candon (2004) observed in their extensive study of MADOE,  
The [Massachusetts] Department of Education has traditionally been perceived as 
an agency whose primary purposes were distributing funds and ensuring 
compliance with legal regulations. The charge for the state to be a partner to 
schools and districts and a support for instructional improvement is an expansion 
of the state role, which will take considerable planning and effort to enact. (p. 11)  
From a national perspective, Marc Tucker and Thomas Toch (2004) concluded much the same, 
“State departments of education have never been equipped to do the kind of work that NCLB 
now demands” (p. 3). Moreover, most interventions have focused on financial and management 
issues, not academic problems, presenting a very different and more challenging endeavor 
(Seder, 2000; Wong & Shen, 2003).  
Understanding the experience of MADOE interventions may also prove valuable since state 
interventions in low-performing schools will likely increase simply because “NCLB guidelines 
require quicker action than many state policies had previously called for” (Elmore, 2003, p. 2; also 
see Seder, 2000). As of fall 2006 in Massachusetts alone, using NCLB criteria, 37% of all schools 
(more than 600) were identified as in need of improvement,. Another 47 were identified for 
corrective action and 57 were identified for restructuring.4 In California,  so-called turn-around 
teams from the state intervened in 24 schools in 2003. Driven by “NCLB’s progressively-tougher 
standards,” in 2006 as many as 3,600 schools were slated for intervention (Tucker & Toch, 2004, p. 
3). Nationally, during the 2005–06 school year states ordered approximately 1,750 schools into some 
form of radical restructuring, an increase of 44% from the previous year (Feller, 2006).  
To heighten the challenge, there is limited understanding of what it takes to turn around 
chronically low-performing schools. Reville, Coggins, and Candon (2005) put the matter in stark 
terms, saying MADOE must develop an intervention system, “which no state in the country has 
                                                 
4 Corrective action status is assigned to schools that fail to make AYP for four consecutive years. 
Such schools may choose to implement a new curriculum, replace school staff, provide teacher professional 
development, or extend the school day or year, among other options. After one year, a school that still fails to 
make AYP is assigned restructuring status and may close and reopen as a charter school, enter into a contract 
with a private management company, hire new staff, be taken over by the state, or engage in other 
(unspecified) restructuring of school governance (U.S. Department of Education, 2003).  
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done completely and for which no proven models exist” (p. 15). Research conducted more broadly 
supports this claim. In a study of state departments of education, Tucker and Toch (2004) found, 
“[S]tate agencies that NCLB relies on to carry out its sweeping mandates simply don’t have the 
capacity to do so” (p. 2). Richard Elmore (2003) maintained much the same: “[N]othing in the 
recent history of state accountability efforts has equipped states or localities to handle the number of 
schools that will likely be classified as low-performing under NCLB” (p. 5). 
Given this formidable undertaking, it is no surprise that states have encountered 
considerable frustration in what efforts they have made to assist low-performing schools. In their 
study of MADOE, Reville et al. (2005) highlighted this concern: “[N]o concrete strategy for technical 
assistance at the district level exists.… Currently, the state provides minimal technical assistance [to 
low-performing schools] where it provides any” (pp. 15–16; emphasis in original). Likewise, Carol 
Keirstead & Cynthia Harvell (2005) found that in four low-performing Massachusetts schools state 
intervention strategies “were insufficient for helping schools improve instructional practice” (p. 1).  
Studies beyond Massachusetts support this view. After investigating fiscal and academic 
accountability measures promoted through varied intervention strategies, Seder (2000) wrote, “The 
track record… is mixed.… State intervention strategies return fiscal soundness to districts typically 
in three to five years, but student achievement often lags behind” (p. i). He further cautioned: 
“None of the various state-intervention strategies should be seen as panaceas. Even in those districts 
deemed successful, student performance still lags behind national and state averages and falls below 
state performance standards” (p. 28). In related research, Brady (2003) examined three prominent 
intervention strategies. Based on what he found, Brady concluded that in most cases, state 
intervention did not significantly improve student performance; no particular intervention appeared 
more successful than any other; interventions were uneven in implementation and hard to sustain; 
and as school contexts varied markedly, it was nearly impossible to determine which interventions 
were most effective. Consistent with Seder (2000) and Brady (2003), in a review of research on state 
takeovers of schools and districts Ziebarth (2004) wrote, “[S]tate takeovers, for the most part, have 
yet to produce dramatic and consistent increases in student performance” (p. 2). To some degree, 
these frustrating developments may reflect the fact that little research exists on state intervention in 
low-performing schools (McRobbie, 1998; Spreng, 2005; Wong & Shen, 2003). While many states 
have plans to intervene in schools, “little evaluation of the effectiveness of these actions on 
improving student and school performance has occurred” (Rudo, 2001, p. 1). Ziebarth’s (2004) 
review of research stated the matter plainly: “There is a limited amount of research… on the effects 
of state takeovers” (p. 2).  
Despite limited research, there may be consensus on one issue: successful intervention will 
likely entail a long-term commitment by all parties (Phenix, Siegel, Zaltsman, & Fruchter, 2005; 
Reville, et al., 2005; Vu, 2006). Drawing on the British experience, Turner (1998), the director of a  
school identified as failing, saw a long-term strategy as essential: “[A]n ‘education agency’ taking over 
a school will not of itself improve the school. Genuine improvement will occur only with the 
commitment of the staff, so commitment must be encouraged and nurtured” (p. 97). Further, as 
Odden and Busch (1998) maintained, since “substantive school restructuring requires that teachers 
develop an array of new professional expertise” successful interventions can be achieved “only 
through ongoing, long-term professional development” (p. 35). Yet even though since 1988 “more 
than half of all states have passed laws that allow state authorities to take control of local school 
districts” (Hammer, 2005, p. 1), few state departments of education have undertaken interventions 
longer than ten years.5 In a related vein, Brady (2003) questioned the NCLB timeframe: “The law 
                                                 
5 California, for instance, had many NCLB-like accountability measures in place by the mid-1990s, 
including state interventions. Since 1997, North Carolina’s Department of Public Instruction has sent 
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may expect too much too fast. If successful interventions take two to three years to begin to 
manifest results in terms of AYP, then the measures of success may prove slower than many of the 
law’s timelines tolerate” (p. 32; emphasis in original). Tucker and Toch (2004) framed the challenge 
in daunting terms: “[W]e need a long-term solution, which can only lie in building the capacity of the 
states, districts, and schools to reach the kinds of goals contemplated by the framers of NCLB. This 
is not a simple matter, but a vast, man-to-the-Moon kind of challenge” (p. 5).  
Finally, a study of underperforming schools in Massachusetts could prove valuable because 
most low-performing schools are disproportionately low-income, non-native-English-speaking, 
highly mobile, and in need of special services (Haycock, 2001; Perryman, 2006; Ziebarth, 2004). 
Their teachers are less likely to be certified in subjects they teach and more likely to leave the 
profession or schools where they work (Darling-Hammond, 2004; Peske & Haycock, 2006; Phenix, 
et al., 2005; Stiefel, Rubenstein, and Schwartz, 2004). If states developed effective strategies to 
support these schools, as our research suggests, many would welcome intervention.  
In summary, while increasingly popular, state intervention entails a new role for most 
departments of education. The mixed impact these efforts have had on low-performing schools 
suggests that no one fully understands which strategies are most effective, in part, because few have 
been systematically studied. If consensus exists, it is that states must make a long-term commitment 
to support low-performing schools, whose demographic profiles once again point to the inability of 
the U.S. educational system to educate its most challenging students.  
Methods  
This study draws on both qualitative and quantitative data. Given the novelty of state 
intervention, a mixed-methods approach seemed logical. That is, a general sense of the intervention 
process came through qualitative field investigations in three schools. In turn, insights derived from 
these studies and analyses of state reports and the existing literature provided a foundation for a 
broader survey. The study began in spring 2005 with qualitative investigations of three public 
schools, two middle schools (August and University) and a high school (Morwood).6 All experienced 
state intervention in the form of Massachusetts Department of Education (MADOE) panel reviews 
because of consistently low MCAS scores.7 Morwood and University were subsequently declared 
underperforming. For August, state intervention ended at this point. The qualitative study draws on 
three data sources: 35 hours of interviews with 16 teachers and administrators at the three schools 
reviewed as potentially underperforming,8 six site observations (two at each school) totaling 3 hours, 
and analyses of varied documents, including commissioned reports on state support for low-
performing schools, school improvement plans, MADOE panel review reports, MADOE fact-
finding reviews, and relevant newspaper articles. Teacher interviews took place in the respective 
classrooms during normal school hours, except for one teacher who was interviewed in a guidance 
counselor’s office. Administrator interviews were held in their offices during school hours. In all 
                                                                                                                                                             
“assistance teams” into 56 of the state’s lowest performing schools. Kentucky, too, has provided low-
performing schools with additional staff (Tucker & Toch, 2004). As already noted, MADOE has intervened 
in low-performing schools since 1988 (Reville, et al., 2005). These examples, however, are not the norm. 
6 All school names are pseudonyms.  
7 When considering faculty and administrator reactions to “state intervention,” the reader should 
keep in mind that no intervention is exactly the same since review panels varied site-to-site as well as the 
nature of the intervention, among other factors. 
8See Appendix A for a copy of our interview protocols from school site visits.  
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instances, only the researchers and research participant were present. Each school observation lasted 
about half an hour and focused on the physical appearance of the school, messages posted in 
hallways and classrooms, teacher-student interactions in hallways and cafeterias, and student 
behavior in public spaces.  
To generate our key codes and categories and later to identify patterns and themes derived 
from our qualitative data, we employed a constant comparative analytic method, investigating and 
corroborating our findings in a recursive and iterative fashion (Sipe & Ghiso, 2004; Spradley, 1980). 
Coding and analysis were driven by our research questions, as the conceptual codes and categories 
we focused on offered insight into these questions (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996). Ultimately, we 
organized our data into three domains (Spradley, 1980): initial reactions by faculty and 
administrators to learning about state intervention at their school; teacher and administrator 
perceptions of state intervention over time; and the perceived impact of state intervention on 
students. To assess the validity of our findings—what could be considered a form of theoretical 
sampling (Charmaz, 2000 )—we shared an outline and draft of our manuscript with MADOE 
personnel.  
The Principal Survey9  
Building on understandings derived from our qualitative data, in fall 2006 we designed a 
survey and sent it to principals in the 23 schools declared underperforming by MADOE between 
2000 and 2004.10 Of those principals, 22 replied (a 95.6% response rate).11 The survey included 48 
questions distributed across six sub-sections. The overarching themes included elements key to 
intervention effectiveness, MCAS as a valid measure of achievement, financial and technical support 
associated with the intervention, the degree of school improvement in the intervention, the 
effectiveness of state intervention, and the principals’ experience with the intervention.  
At the time of the survey, more than 90% of principals indicated that they had been at their 
respective schools for five or fewer years. Nearly 75% of respondents indicated that they were not 
their school’s principal prior to the intervention. (Table 1 presents the distribution of the principals’ 
years of experience at their schools and in their districts.) Of the schools where we surveyed 
principals, 50% were elementary schools, 35% were middle schools, 10% were high schools, and 5% 
were K-8 schools. On average, the elementary schools served fewer students, with the majority 
                                                 
9 Two questions from the original survey were excluded from analysis. We removed question 11, 
which asked principals about state funding because some indicated they did not know the exact figures, while 
others included staff salaries, for an instructional coach, for instance, which increased their total considerably. 
Since we could not determine who received a full- or part-time coach as a result of intervention and whether 
that was included in the figures provided us, this question introduced bias that could not be remedied. We 
discarded item 12 because it asked about the clarity of evaluation criteria. Since 75 percent of the responding 
principals were not at their schools when the schools were reviewed their responses would have low validity, 
and since those who were constitute a small minority, these responses were not useful. 
10 Appendix B includes a copy of the survey.  
11 The school that did not return a survey closed at the end of the 2005–06 academic year. From a 
sampling bias perspective, the missing survey should minimally affect our results because four of five schools 
from this city returned a survey. However, because the missing school will close because of its status as an 
underperforming school and its inability to raise student performance—a decision challenged by the principal, 
some teachers, and parents—survey results of this school might differ in intensity and direction from the 
overall sample and other schools in the city. The absence of this school’s survey results introduces some bias 
to our findings. 
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enrolling under 500 students. The two high schools had the highest enrollments. (Table 2 presents 
student enrollment data from the schools.)  
 
Table 1 
Principals’ Experience in School and District 
Years Served 
Any Capacity 
in School 
(%) 
Principal of 
School 
(%) 
Any Capacity in 
District 
(%) 
Less than 1 14 18 14 
1 through 5 73 73 35 
6 through 10 9 9 14 
More than 10 5 0 37 
Note: Percentages will not add to 100% when there is rounding error. 
 
Table 2 
Student Enrollment Data 
Grade level N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Elementary 11 162 713 359 159 
Middle 8 350 710 544 149 
High School 2 1200 1300 1250 70 
K-8 1 600 600 600 N/A 
 
The survey provided a means to test our qualitative findings by assessing the extent to which 
interview data and observations collected in spring 2005 from the three schools that experienced 
state interventions in 2001 might generalize to the schools reviewed and declared underperforming 
by the state between 2000 and 2004. Given the high response rate, we believe we gained a more 
nuanced understanding of principals’ views on state intervention from our qualitative study and feel 
more confident in our overall findings. Moreover, as these principals experienced intervention for at 
least one-and-a-half years, and some as long as five-and-a-half years, we feel they could make 
informed evaluations of this experience.  
Although 95.6% of principals responded to the survey, the sample is small. Thus, we were 
limited in the inferential statistical techniques we could apply. Instead, we conducted frequency 
analyses, examining the distribution of responses in the different categories. Given the high response 
rate, we feel confident in the reliability of our findings, though as the number of schools found 
underperforming increases, principal survey responses may differ.  
In terms of our research design, we treated high schools, middle schools, and elementary 
schools in a similar fashion. In analyzing interview, archival, survey, and observational data we did 
not assess how differing school contexts influenced state intervention. While this accords with most 
research to-date, we realize differences exist among the three levels of schooling. Nonetheless, we 
found that state intervention affected all schools in some similar ways. That is what we document 
and analyze.  
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Limitations 
Three limitations of this study require mention. First, our qualitative cases did not include an 
elementary school. Given that many underperforming schools in Massachusetts are elementary 
schools, future research should examine how elementary school teachers and administrators perceive 
state intervention, especially since research suggests that interventions at this level tend to be more 
successful (e.g., Learmoth & Lowers, 1998). Second, we did not include students in this study. They 
should be part of any study that seeks to understand the impact of state intervention. And third, 
some school personnel, especially teachers, may not fully understand what an intervention entails, as 
some may only experience a small aspect of the larger experience. Nonetheless, we tended to 
characterize state intervention in ways that suggested it was understood in a uniform fashion by all 
of our research participants. In future research, teachers and administrators should be offered the 
opportunity to clarify how they are defining the intervention process.  
The Three Schools  
University Middle School 
Due to overcrowding in the city’s other two middle schools, its district created University 
Middle School and first enrolled students in the school in fall 2000. In 2001, the school enrolled 
nearly 700 7th and 8th grade students—50% White students, nearly 30% Hispanic, slightly more 
than 10% Asian, and less than 10% African American. Compared with the city’s other middle 
schools, University served a challenging student population. Over half were eligible for free or 
reduced price lunch—more than twice the state average. Over one-third spoke a first language other 
than English. More than half of all students were reading below grade level. The school enrolled 
more than two-thirds of the district's 7th and 8th grade special education population and 
approximately 60% of its English language learners (ELLs) (MADOE, 2002a). 
As a new school, University faced additional challenges. One stemmed from student 
demographics and a selection bias in who attended. As one administrator recalled, the school “did 
not receive a fair placement of students… [One middle school] literally hand-picked who they 
wanted. [University] received kids who weren’t scoring quite as well.” The MADOE (2002a) panel 
review report confirmed this perception, noting that “20 percent of 7th graders [had] failed multiple 
subjects in 6th grade.” University also had relatively limited resources, as the administrator 
explained: “This building [had been] a high school and… anything that was worth anything [faculty] 
took with them when they went to the new building.”  
University was deemed underperforming by the state in spring 2002, the only school so 
designated in its district.12 While the school community felt stigmatized by the decision, it also 
served as impetus for reform. The district hired a new principal, and the school community 
collectively articulated a vision to which teachers, administrators, and students seemed committed. 
Throughout interviews, teachers and administrators expressed a desire to see the school through its 
improvement efforts and free of the underperforming designation. Speaking to the level of faculty 
commitment, the principal remarked, “It’s been a great experience here. The people really want to 
                                                 
12 Although University only enrolled students for two years at this point, the state made this 
determination based on how University students had done when they were enrolled in the city’s other middle 
schools.  
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do well.” Moreover, after being labeled underperforming, there was considerable faculty turnover, 
which has led some, including the principal, to maintain that University is “now a very different 
school.”  
In the following year, University made AYP for English/Language Arts (ELA) in the 
aggregate and for all subgroups. In math, the school made AYP in the aggregate. The following two 
years the school had a mixed performance, attaining AYP in the aggregate and for all subgroups in 
ELA but failing to do so in math. In 2006 and 2007, University’s performance declined notably. 
Both years, the school failed to make AYP in ELA and math in the aggregate and for the school’s 
subgroups. Having failed to make AYP for two consecutive years in ELA, as of January 2007, it was 
in the first year of NCLB’s improvement status. 13 As a result, the school had to revise this aspect of 
its improvement plan, and the district had to offer parents the opportunity to transfer their children 
to other district schools and provide the school with technical assistance. Having failed to make 
AYP for four years in math, its 2007 NCLB status for math was in the second year of restructuring 
(MADOE, 2007). The consequences for this development were much the same as for improvement 
year 1 except that the district had to implement fundamental reforms that include changing the 
school’s governance or staffing.  
August Middle School  
August Middle School is one of 20 middle schools located in a major city. In 2001, the 
school enrolled about 700 students, more than 80% African-American. The remaining 20% included 
a mix of Latino, Asian, and White students. Of this population, 75% were eligible for free or 
reduced-price lunch and nearly 30% spoke a first language other than English (MADOE, 2001a). 
August underwent a panel review in spring 2001 because the school failed to make AYP in both 
math and ELA in the aggregate the previous year (prior to 2003, MADOE did not assess whether 
schools made AYP for the various subgroups). The school, however, was never declared 
underperforming. For August, the panel review went rather well. As the report noted:  
[T]he school has clearly identified its problems and concerns, especially in math 
and literacy.… Goals in the School Improvement Plan are directly tied to areas of 
identified weakness.… The specific strategies planned in literacy and math seem 
likely to yield a good result as they are aligned with a strong data analysis effort 
on the part of the school and are correlated with State Standards. (MADOE, 
2001a)  
Moreover, the report indicated, “Interviews and observations show that faculty and staff are 
familiar with the school plan and are working diligently to implement it.… [Further,] there is a 
quarterly review of progress on meeting the goals” (MADOE, 2001a). To conclude, the panel 
wrote: “August Middle School does appear to have a sound plan for improving student 
performance and the conditions appear to be in place for successful implementation of the 
school’s improvement plan” (MADOE, 2001a).  
Fully in line with this optimistic assessment, in 2001 and 2002 August made AYP in math 
and ELA. However, from 2004 to 2007 the school proved unable to sustain these improvements in 
test scores and failed to make AYP in the aggregate and for certain subgroups in both math and 
ELA. As of December 2007, the school’s AYP accountability status for both math and ELA was in 
                                                 
13 As of June 2007, MADOE no longer uses the label, “underperforming.” Instead, any school with an 
unacceptable NCLB status is rated in terms of five dimensions ranked in terms of degree of severity: identified for 
improvement—year 1, identified for improvement—year 2, corrective action, restructuring—year 1, and restructuring—
year 2.  
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the first year of NCLB’s restructuring. As a result, the district, working with teachers and parents, 
must analyze the school’s needs and develop a plan for fundamental reforms aimed at improving 
student performance (MADOE, 2007).  
Morwood High 
Located in a the same city as August Middle School, in 2001 Morwood High enrolled 
approximately 1300 students, 50% African American, 40% Hispanic, 8% White, and 2% Asian. Of 
all students, 70% qualified for free/reduced price lunch, nearly three times the state average. The 
school also enrolled many ELL students, with over 50% of all students speaking a first language 
other than English. In general, the school has a poor reputation in the local community. A recent 
article in the local paper spoke to this issue. In a class with 17 students, for instance, nine were 
absent. On back-to-school night, one teacher had no parents visit his classroom. And by the end of 
the first quarter, more than 25% of all students had failed five of their six classes.  
In 2000, Morwood High was declared underperforming. Identifying key factors behind this 
decision, the panel review report pointed to “the absence of systematic data collection and use to 
monitor curriculum implementation, instructional practices, and student achievement.” It continued, 
asserting that “low expectations are evident in many classes” and that “there was no improvement 
plan in place that used multiple sources of data to address student and staff needs with clear goals, 
benchmarks, and assessments of progress.”  
Despite these concerns, in 2001 and 2002 Morwood met AYP standards in the aggregate in 
both math and ELA. As with the other two study schools, however, Morwood proved unable to 
sustain these gains, and from 2003 to 2007 the school never made AYP for subgroups in ELA or 
math, although in alternating years they did make AYP in the aggregate for ELA and math. As of 
December 2007, the school’s AYP accountability status was the second year of restructuring 
(MADOE, 2007), the same as University Middle School. 
State Intervention in Massachusetts 
State intervention in Massachusetts is a three-stage process. It begins with a review by 
MADOE of schools performing lowest on the English/Language Arts and mathematics MCAS 
exams, using trend analyses to identify those showing little or no improvement in the last three or 
more years.14 Depending on resources, the State then identifies schools for an initial panel review, to 
evaluate whether a school should be declared underperforming. Before the review, school and 
district administrators develop a plan to improve student performance. MADOE staff, accompanied 
by three-to-five practitioners, then review the plan and various indicators of student performance, 
including school demographic data, MCAS scores, dropout and attendance statistics, information on 
teacher qualifications, AYP reports, school improvement plans, and a teacher survey, among other 
data sources. The panel spends one day with school and district administrators and one day on-site 
with the goal of addressing two questions. First, is the school implementing a sound plan for 
improvement and what gains have been achieved to date as a result of this implementation? Second, 
do the conditions appear to be in place for successful implementation of the school’s improvement 
                                                 
14 Of late, there have been some minimal changes made to the underperforming school selection process. With 
the recent selection of a new Commissioner of Education, more substantial changes are anticipated. 
Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol. 16 No. 18 12 
plan? After reviewing the panel’s report, the Commissioner of Education decides whether to 
designate a school underperforming (MADOE, 2001b).  
For schools designated underperforming, the process moves to a third stage, where 3–5 
practitioners and one or two MADOE employees conduct a fact-finding review of the school. This 
review includes two days of research during which panel members observe classes and interview 
students, teachers, and school and district administrators. The panel then produces a report that 
highlights the school’s strengths and weaknesses and serves as a guide for revising the school 
improvement plan, which is authored jointly by district personnel and panel members. Schools that 
fail to improve student achievement over the next two years are declared chronically 
underperforming. MADOE then specifies actions the “district shall take to improve the academic 
performance of students,” which can include granting principals increased flexibility in hiring and 
dismissing teachers (MADOE, n.d.). 
Initial Reactions to State Intervention 
Where one starts with school reform often has a big impact on where he or she ends up 
(Fullan & Stiegelbauer, 1991; McQuillan & Welner, 2007). To assess how best to promote change 
through state intervention, it helps to know how teachers and administrators initially reacted to 
public declaration of their potentially underperforming status since this creates a first impression 
that shapes how school personnel perceive much of what follows.  
Welcoming State Intervention  
Upon learning that MADOE would intervene at their schools in the form of a panel review, 
some teachers and administrators welcomed the news, viewing state intervention as an appropriate 
step toward school improvement. In this regard, a University teacher explained:  
I felt optimistic about [the intervention] because it’s good for someone to step in 
and look at what’s wrong [because] then they can change things because we 
should all be… trying to improve things, trying to do better work for the 
students… .I think accountability is great.  
Welcoming state intervention, a second University teacher believed it would benefit the school’s 
underserved English language learners:  
I was upset because we were labeled. But in a way, I was also very happy because 
a lot of my ESL students sometimes are not counted as children that could 
actually be part of the whole picture… [Now,] they have… to be tested. And I 
was upset because I knew they had to take a new test that I knew they would fail. 
But I knew this failure was going to not only benefit them, but it was going to 
benefit the whole school because sometimes I find when something is wrong you 
get upset because it is wrong but there’s a new door that opens up which helps 
the whole situation.  
Often, school personnel who welcomed intervention qualified their remarks, expressing various 
concerns about the process and its ultimate effect on their schools. As a Morwood teacher who 
had been at the school over 20 years noted, “I couldn’t imagine what took them so long… [But] 
I don’t know if it’s going to bring any significant positive change, like so many other things that 
happen and no significant change comes out of them.” An August teacher expressed support 
with reservation as well:  
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If someone says, “I’m going to help you do better, get more equipment, get 
better materials,” it’s always welcomed. But how is it going to be done? Will it be 
saying, “Well, you’re not doing anything good here, I don’t see any positives….” 
I don’t think anybody is going to refuse [help]. But if the approach is punitive I 
don’t know if it’s going to be productive. 
A second August teacher offered a similar reaction:  
I think there would be [benefits to intervention], yes. The purpose of the state 
coming would be to help, right? And if they come in like that and that’s what 
they’re trying to do—“I’m not criticizing, I’m coming in to help. This is where 
you are, and you need help in these areas, and we have the expertise and the 
material”—then supposedly everybody should win, supposedly. 
In her afterthought, “supposedly,” this teacher spoke to a tension expressed by many—
acknowledging a need for assistance but, based in part on past experience, questioning whether 
MADOE intervention would prove effective or respectful. Given the novelty of state 
intervention, this skepticism seems no surprise.  
Feeling Unjustly Treated 
When teachers and administrators first heard MADOE targeted their school for intervention 
many expressed a sense of inequity, arguing that the state ignored myriad factors that affected 
student learning but which school personnel considered outside their control. And since these 
factors were outside their control, was it fair to hold only them accountable? Describing the chaotic 
nature of her students’ lives, a Morwood teacher explained:  
Teachers should be held accountable for the performance of our kids, but we’re 
not solely responsible for the underperformance of students in this school. There 
are a multitude of problems… they have to overcome before they get to my 
classroom. It’s not an excuse for what they’re not doing, it’s just reality… Many 
of our kids live on their own… Many of them live in shelters. I have immigrant 
kids living in apartments with no parents, working full-time, often taking care of 
younger siblings. These are just some of the problems.  
An August teacher offered a comparable reaction, acknowledging her commitment to student 
achievement though well aware of the challenges her students faced:  
[W]hat I’m doing just doesn’t overcome… some hurdles [students] have to 
overcome. And it frustrates me and angers me… How come if I’m putting my 
heart and soul into this we still aren’t getting anywhere? How do we control the 
things we can’t control?… If kids haven’t gone to bed at night, if they have no 
breakfast in the morning? Or [what] if no one will come up [to visit the school]? 
… What about the kids [and the fact] that it’s January… and this is the third 
place they’ve been [in school this year]?… There’s so much we can’t control and 
it is frustrating to say you are underperforming.  
The number of special needs students a school served represented another structural factor 
beyond control of school personnel that shaped overall student achievement and potentially 
MCAS scores. Alluding to options accorded charter and pilot schools, a Morwood administrator 
observed:  
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[Charter and pilot schools]15 can refuse to serve these students. We have no 
choice but to take them. We have a wide range of different functioning levels of 
[special education]. Some kids are just physically challenged…. Others need to 
have their diapers changed several times a day…. We have autistic kids [and 
students with vision problems for whom] everything has to be translated into 
Braille. 
This posed an instructional challenge for teachers, but also triggered feelings of unjust 
treatment. NCLB limits the proportion of special needs students that can be excluded from the 
regular assessment and instead be tested via alternate assessment to 1% per state. Teachers felt 
that the policy does not discriminate between schools that have more severe special needs 
students who still attend within the regular district school from those who attend specially-
designated schools that service students with more serious needs. At our study schools, teachers 
were held accountable for all students’ performance regardless of any cognitive limitations.  
An additional complication mentioned by several teachers was the growth in English 
language learning (ELL) populations, combined with a new state law eliminating bilingual education. 
Known as the Unz Initiative (named after the Silicon Valley entrepreneur Ron Unz, who sponsored 
several ballot measures in different states to end bilingual education), the law requires that students 
with limited English skills are now integrated into mainstreamed classes where instruction is only in 
English. Consequently, the Unz initiative seems to have exacerbated the challenge of teaching ELL 
students on multiple levels. First, some teachers now must work with students representing a wide 
range of English skills: some who know no English, some who have previous exposure to the 
language, and fluent English speakers. In addition, the state requires that all students be assessed in 
mathematics regardless of English proficiency levels or the number of years the student has been in 
the country. Exclusions from testing in ELA are allowed only for students who have been in the 
country less than a year. This posed a significant challenge for teachers. As an August teacher 
observed:  
[S]tudents now who are not proficient in English are taking [the MCAS] and the 
test is part of the overall score of the school. So if you have a school with a large 
population of English language learners, then you have a problem…. Before they 
only had to take the test after three years, but now it’s changed.16 
A Morwood teacher spoke to the same tension:  
We have kids coming from foreign countries without knowing a word of English. 
They’re thrown into a course and don’t know what is going on because they can’t 
understand. As a teacher, you have to do your best to accommodate them, and 
try to keep up with the rest of the class, 25 to 30 kids…. [But] how can I get 
them ready for MCAS… in one… year?17 
Beyond ELL and special needs students, teachers found that some students had such academic 
deficiencies that there was little chance they would perform at grade level. An August Middle 
School teacher explained:  
                                                 
15 Pilot schools are essentially in-district charters that are granted autonomy in certain areas, such as 
curriculum and hiring, but remain in the district.  
16 Massachusetts public school students must take the MCAS exam after they have been enrolled in 
schools for one year.  
17 Three years after Massachusetts ended its bilingual programs by voter mandate, after one year of 
schooling, eighty-three percent of non-native English speakers in grades 3 through 12 could not read, write, 
or understand English well enough to function in a regular classroom. Of those who were in school at least 
three years, more than half were not fluent (Schetti & Jan, 2006).  
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If we have a child coming to us at the 2nd or 3rd grade level, which does happen, 
and we bring this child by 8th grade to the 6th grade [achievement] level, we are 
underperforming because the child is not leaving us with an 8th grade 
[achievement] level. But are we able to do that in three years?… [W]hat I know is 
that from where we were, we’ve made progress.  
The source of this frustration is mainly that the NCLB-approved metric for measuring progress 
does not do so relative to a student’s starting point. As such, educators considered it unfair to 
expect a school to meet some absolute expectation insensitive to the school population’s 
starting point. A more appropriate teacher accountability measure might be one that determines 
the value teachers add during the school year. Thus, a teacher who brings a student from the 
second to sixth grade level of proficiency would be recognized as having made progress even if 
the student is in the eighth grade. 
Teachers and administrators also questioned whether their schools had the resources to 
realize goals set by the state. In the words of a University administrator: “[It is damning] to label a 
school underperforming and you don’t give them enough money for them to do what they need to 
do. We don’t have technology here, and other schools have that. That really puts teachers at a 
disadvantage.” Explaining why textbooks were piled up in his classroom, an August teacher 
addressed the issue of limited resources:  
[The textbooks] are in the class because [students] are not allowed to take them 
home…. This year I was surprised to hear I was not going to be able to issue 
textbooks. So I said, “How are kids supposed to read at home?” They said, “Well 
they can’t, so you have to make copies for them.” I’m not even thinking about 
that.  
Some school personnel questioned the use of a single exam, MCAS, as key to school 
evaluations. An August teacher elaborated:  
It’s not that [MCAS] is not important but…  I don’t think one test will show you 
the entire scope of what a child can do. First of all, it is a test that happens at the 
end of the year. It is high-pressure because you have days and days of testing, 
which tests the kids’ stamina, as far as I’m concerned. And this is not the only 
test. We give writing prompts [i.e., assessments similar to many MCAS items]. We 
give the SRI [Scholastic Reading Inventory], and we have to give finals…. It’s a 
lot happening at the same time which means [students] come to a point where 
they’re just tired and they just write without thinking.  
A University administrator saw matters in a similar light: “As a teacher, I never used one exam 
as the grade for students…. There’s too much emphasis placed upon MCAS. There’s a 
tremendous amount of growth happening in kids that you don’t capture in [standardized] 
testing.”  
Aspects of these varied tensions linked to equity, morale, and high-stakes assessment arose 
in the principal surveys as well. For one, when asked whether “student performance on MCAS is an 
accurate measure of student achievement,” 45% either strongly agreed (14%) or agreed (32%), while 
32% disagreed (27%) or strongly disagreed (5%). So while more principals considered MCAS a valid 
measure of achievement than did not, it was not a majority, and nearly 20% were uncertain. (It 
should be noted here that about half of the principals are from elementary schools, which is 
consistent with the levels of the schools reviewed by the state during the time period examined in 
this study). Here, too, a sizable percentage of school practitioners questioned the validity of MCAS 
to assess student achievement. When asked whether “student performance on MCAS is an accurate 
measure of teacher effectiveness,” principals were equally divided, with slightly more than 40% 
agreeing (36%) or strongly agreeing (5%), while the same percentage disagreed (32%) or strongly 
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disagreed (9%). To an extent, those disagreeing with the statement may believe, as did many 
teachers, that aspects of student MCAS performance are outside teacher control or that the exam 
simply is not a valid measure of teacher effectiveness.  
Demoralized  
As one might expect, many school personnel felt demoralized with being reviewed as 
potentially underperforming. Asked whether there is a stigma associated with this designation, a 
University administrator stated, “Absolutely.” A Morwood teacher elaborated:  
You can’t help but take [the label] personally when the whole country is blaming 
teachers for student underperformance, including the president. It’s a given. If 
the kids are not learning, [teachers] are not performing as they should. It’s the 
teachers.  
How is staff morale? 
From what I can see, it’s horrible.  
An August Middle School teacher described the impact of being designated underperforming as 
disheartening:  
Do I take that label to heart? That’s me, underperforming? 
Or do you think others perceive it as that? 
Unfortunately, it’s both… [I]f others perceive us that way, then I take it to heart, 
I take it personally. They’re not going to say, “Well the school is 
underperforming but Rachel is doing a great job.” They’re not going to put it in 
the paper that way. It’s going to be, “The school is underperforming,” and they’re 
not going to mention anyone’s name that’s doing a good job. They can’t. And I 
would then perceive… “Something is wrong. It’s my fault.”  
These remarks from the interviews suggest that teachers internalize the underperforming label. 
They view it as a reflection of the caliber of their work and their contribution to students’ 
success or failure. In addition, it affects their morale. They perceive themselves as being looked 
down upon not only by the “president,” as one teacher put it, but more importantly by their 
local community.  The principals’ survey shows how critical they perceive morale to be in 
ridding their school of the underperforming label.  In the survey, principals overwhelmingly 
endorsed the importance of “good teacher morale” to making an intervention successful, as 
91% rated this factor as “essential” (36%) or “very important” (55%) to “the effectiveness of 
DOE intervention.” Yet when asked whether the intervention “has positively affected teacher 
morale,” only 26% agreed (22%) or strongly agreed (5%). Fifty percent disagreed (27%) or 
strongly disagreed (23%), with 23% uncertain. So while principals felt that “good teacher 
morale” was critical to an intervention, few believed the process promoted positive morale.  
Upon learning their school would undergo state intervention teachers and administrators all 
responded at some emotional level (Evans, 1996; Hargreaves, 2004a, 2004b; Keirstead & Harvell, 
2005). Some welcomed intervention, while others maintained that their school was not 
underperforming, at least relative to other schools. Many felt unjustly treated, and some were 
demoralized. Touching on varied tensions linked to state intervention, an August teacher with 33 
years’ experience offered her thoughts on why this experience represents such a challenge for all 
involved:  
I guess I’m frustrated… [W]e’re starting at a negative before we even begin. 
Those schools in Wellesley [an affluent district], the state’s not going to be 
coming in to them… I want someone to oversee what we’re doing and make sure 
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we’re doing a good job. But if it’s in comparison to Wellesley, I’m not too sure 
I’m happy about that unless you want to give us equal funding and equal 
resources… I can see both worlds. I know somebody has to oversee us… But I 
also see stress in the fact that every school is held to the same accountability 
[standards]. Every school is not teaching the same population of kids, does not 
have the same resources, does not have the same parental support. It’s not an 
equal system. But… every school is held to that same standard.  
In many ways, these remarks speak to the complexity of state interventions in chronically low-
achieving schools. Even though this teacher recognized a need for oversight and accountability, 
she did not welcome intervention; rather, she reacted with skepticism, questioning whether her 
school was being judged fairly.  
Teachers and Administrator Perceptions of State Intervention  
Assessing teacher and administrator perceptions of state intervention reveals a continuum. 
For some, state intervention has led to positive outcomes. For others, intervention has had a 
negligible, if any, impact on their schools. Still others view intervention as largely negative. 
Intertwined with these reactions are  issues of respect and trust as well as concern for finding time to 
do the work required of underperforming schools.  
Benefits of State Intervention 
In his role as a British civil servant charged with enacting government policy on school 
effectiveness, Michael Stark (1998) argued that “the public identification of unacceptable standards 
[in a public school] tends to speed rather than delay recovery, and indeed is often a precondition for 
[recovery]” (p. 35). He continued, “[M]ost schools have not been destroyed by special measures 
[e.g., state interventions]; in most cases they have been revived” (p. 43). Consistent with this view, 
several teachers and administrators in our study saw benefits to state intervention. A University 
administrator, for example, felt the intervention energized his faculty, leading them to reflect more 
intensively on their practice, and to collaborate  in addressing their perceived needs:  
I can’t tell you how much support, cooperation I’ve gotten from teachers… Most 
people here spend a great deal of time after school, they go the extra mile… [The 
teachers] have changed… [B]eing under the gun of being underperforming makes 
my job more difficult, but it’s an advantage too. [Teachers] don’t want this label, 
so they’ll do whatever it takes to get rid of it. They really are concerned about 
that, so it’s a positive thing here… They’re not seeking the marginal anymore… 
This has forced [teachers] to examine what they do… I thank [MADOE] for 
bringing my staff together and making them even more unified… This has been 
my most rewarding experience in education. 
In comparable fashion, a University teacher commented on how faculty mobilized to develop a 
school improvement plan during a voluntary, two-day summer workshop:  
I think about 90% of the staff came in… The school administration got a lot of 
feedback and support from the staff… I thought it was really positive because… 
[teachers] were really committed. I think there are very few teachers who felt this 
wasn’t a positive thing because they’d have to do more work… [T]hey want to do 
things to improve overall [student] scores. 
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A second University teacher felt the intervention pushed faculty to think more deeply about 
teaching:  
It has had a positive impact in terms of the lower end of the teaching staff who 
didn’t necessarily give a lot of thought and consideration to what they were 
doing. They’ve had to raise the bar. [In fact,] we’ve all stepped up to the 
[challenge]… [W] e’ve been forced to look at ourselves and reflect more. And 
that’s been the positive part.  
Likewise, an August teacher remarked on the better documentation and reflection prompted by 
the intervention:  
[W]e had to document a lot… That is very helpful and encouraging because you 
say, “Wow, we do a lot of things. We put a lot of things in place…” [T]he 
process made us better teachers because we started to be aware of what made 
better teachers. 
Although no questions prompted participants to comment on unskilled or unprofessional 
colleagues, related topics arose, especially at Morwood. An administrator, for instance, 
bemoaned the impact some teachers have on faculty attitudes: “Teachers can be barriers [to 
improvement]. The ones that are ineffective and poison the staff, those are the worst. It’s not 
enough that they’re not helping, but they feel a need to take others down with them.” Another 
Morwood administrator admitted that some faculty “have no more business teaching in an 
urban school because they don’t like these children. They have low expectations of them. For 
them this is just about a paycheck.” She continued, “There are teachers who are opposed to 
professional development. They refuse to do it… [They] had to be threatened with losing their 
jobs before they even consider… doing the right thing by their kids.”  
Administrators and teachers at other schools shared similar views. A University 
administrator touted the benefits of teacher turnover: “Most of the people who wanted to retire 
[have] retired. We’ve brought a number of great people to replace them. It’s a different school than 
it was two-and-a-half, three years ago when [the State] did the review.” A University teacher 
acknowledged the importance of accountability:  
I think teachers that can’t be held accountable shouldn’t be here because some 
people are just waiting to retire, or some people who are not ready to retire are 
here because of vacation days. I know that because I’ve spoken to people like 
that.  
In line with such remarks, every principal who responded to our survey agreed that the ability to 
remove ineffective teachers was either essential (68%) or very important (27%) to the success of 
state intervention (5% missing). Yet when teachers—even incompetent ones—lose their jobs, 
school climate can suffer. A Morwood teacher spoke to this issue, “From what I can see, 
[morale] is horrible… because a lot of people are concerned about continuing to be here… They 
feel they are under attack, not just from the state, but from the city, the administration.” So even 
those who saw state intervention in a positive light acknowledged that school climate and faculty 
morale could suffer.  
Limited Impact  of State Intervention 
Although faculty and administrators attributed multiple benefits to state intervention, many 
also said MADOE efforts had a limited effect on their school, often because the state provided 
neither adequate funding nor technical assistance. In terms of funding, a Morwood guidance 
counselor dismissed state intervention: “They gave us $25,000. What can we do systemically with 
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that? We can’t even hire a teacher.”18 A University teacher also considered funding inadequate: “If 
the state’s going to hold us accountable, give us some money. I know there isn’t a lot to give, but 
cutting funding and then holding us to higher standards, it’s not possible.” A University 
administrator expressed frustration with MADOE technical support: “I was promised more to help 
me prepare for the last visit of the sister organization. I don’t think I really got anything.”  
Teachers and administrators also said the intervention had limited impact because MADOE 
never fully understood their schools, in part because they spent little time there. As a University 
administrator explained, “Their job is very difficult… I’ve done [school accreditation] reviews and 
we’re there three days and we all think we need at least another day to really evaluate the school. I 
don’t know how they can come in and evaluate a school in one day.”19 Addressing the question, 
“Was the state justified in labeling your school underperforming?” a Morwood teacher said much 
the same: “Absolutely!… Whether or not they have actually discerned the true causes for 
underperforming I’m doubtful… They didn’t spend enough time in classrooms, observing on all the 
floors, or really talking to people.” A second Morwood teacher concurred: “I felt like they came in, 
did their thing, and were out… [L]ooking at how little I saw them, I have very little faith in how 
they’re going to help us.” 
These qualitative findings align with survey data. In assessing whether “the DOE 
understands the challenges my school faces with serving our student population,” more than 80% of 
principals were either uncertain (27%), disagreed (36%), or strongly disagreed (18%). Responding to 
open-ended survey questions, principals offered comparable criticisms: 
Monitoring has been less than effective. Last year our monitor came in two times. 
The feedback was received over three months later and was VERY generic. The 
reports said the same thing for all schools in our district. 
 
DOE process was not helpful. Did not provide technical assistance to improve 
curriculum, assessment, and instruction. Did not have consistent DOE monitors.  
 
There is minimal analysis of actual strategies to change schools (beyond writing 
plans)… Turning around failing schools is complex work. Most of the official 
discussion is quite superficial usually a) ideological, or b) bureaucratic, or c) 
platitudinous. 
 
DOE monitor… changed three times in two years. Monitor stayed at school for 
approximately two hours each visit (three visits per year) and then wrote a report 
based on that short visit. Monitor did not visit classrooms or talk to teachers… 
Provided some PIM [performance improvement mapping] training but never 
gave guidance after initial training.  
Further, responding to the statement, “DOE intervention at my school has been effective,” 36% 
agreed and 9% strongly agreed.  
Despite such criticism, when assessing the impact of state intervention on instruction, 
curriculum, faculty ability to analyze MCAS data, using MCAS data to enhance student achievement, 
writing the school improvement plan, achieving performance goals, instructional planning, 
identifying student learning gaps, parental/caregiver involvement, and aligning professional 
                                                 
18 The guidance counselor cites $25,000 as the total funds the school received. In our research, we 
were told the school received $50,000. 
19 Officially, state intervention includes a two-day school visit. However, the fact finding team spends 
one day with school and district administrators outside the school.  
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development to student learning gaps—all potential aspects of the intervention process— principal 
perceptions were consistently positive. On all dimensions, at least 76% responded that their schools 
had made “moderate” or “a great deal” of progress (see Appendix B). To a degree, these conflicting 
results may  happen because school personnel do not fully understand what intervention entails. For 
many, MADOE presence at their school was seen as the intervention, even though the process 
comprised multiple dimensions. This could help explain comments such as the University 
administrator who said, “I feel like the threat of them coming and potentially closing the school was 
more effective than their actual presence.” Perhaps compiling portfolios and creating an 
improvement plan—although part of the intervention process and a positive development—was 
never understood as such.  
Negative Impacts of Intervention on Schools  
Though some school personnel saw benefits derived from state intervention, many felt the 
impact had a negative effect on their schools. This is not uncommon. For instance, in examining 
school accountability measures linked to standards-based reform, O’Day (2002) noted, 
Schools respond unevenly to outcomes-based accountability… [S]chools that are 
better positioned in terms of their socioeconomic composition (i.e., higher SES 
students) and their prior academic performance respond more readily and 
coherently to the demands of external performance-based accountability systems 
than those schools less well situated… [R]esearch suggests that lower performing 
schools actually lose ground relative to the well-positioned schools once an 
external accountability system is instituted. (p. 308)  
After studying four low-performing Massachusetts schools, Keirstead and Harvell (2005) came 
to a comparable conclusion: “State and district actions that are not well integrated or 
coordinated… create additional burdens for schools ill-equipped to manage multiple initiatives” 
(p. 1).  
Consistent with these findings, many teachers and administrators in this study maintained 
that state intervention negatively affected their schools. Some felt their schools were disadvantaged 
by the stigma attached to the underperforming label, which encouraged conscientious parents to 
enroll their children elsewhere. 20 For a Morwood administrator the logic was undeniable: “Would 
you want to send your child to a school you know is underperforming according to the state? Of 
course not.” An August teacher raised the same concern:  
Parents that do their research certainly are not going to choose [a school] that is 
underperforming… [O]ften times the ones that do the research are parents who 
are going to be actively involved in their child’s education. So I think we miss out 
on those parents. We don’t get help from them, which is vital.  
Further, many school personnel considered the work associated with state intervention—most 
derived from MADOE mandates—to be an additional drawback. Voicing a common sentiment, 
a University teacher stated, “[DOE reports] are overwhelming.” A Morwood administrator 
elaborated: 
We have not been able to operate as a real school because all our attention has 
been focused on doing what the DOE wants… It’s not like we’re doing things 
because it’s best for our kids… [I]t’s always around the parameters set by the 
                                                 
20 The MADOE has proposed “softening” its tone and changing the terminology to “priority” or 
“new beginning” schools (Silva, 2006).  
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DOE. You do something and you have to think, “Is this going to fit within the 
guidelines of DOE? Will it meet DOE expectations?”  
A University administrator expressed concern as well: “I’m constantly preparing information for 
the state and… it really takes me away from instruction and working in classrooms… It takes a 
lot of energy…. I should be investing in the school… It’s a good thing to have oversight, but 
there are limits… It’s the most frustrating part of my job.” An August teacher linked the 
additional work to low teacher morale:  
Teacher morale was very, very low because… you had all sorts of additional work 
put upon you. There was the stress of knowing these people were coming… 
[T]here were days you felt there is so much time involved in what we’re doing 
and… I truly want to be working with the kids… I don’t want to be up preparing 
for the meeting the next… rather than preparing the lesson to do the next day.  
Such observations suggest that teachers perceive the demands of state intervention as additional 
factors outside their control that impact student achievement. As many maintained, aspects of 
state intervention seemed unfair. Given this perception, respect seems essential. State personnel 
do not want to demoralize hard-working teachers. The MADOE (n.d.) school review process 
directs panel members to “be polite and sensitive to the school’s needs,” “to try to relieve 
anxiety through mutual respect and valuing the opinions of others,” and “to be supportive and 
enabling,” among other directives (p. 11). However, as the next section describes, some school 
personnel experienced state intervention as disrespectful.  
Unrespected and Distrusted21 
Clearly, state intervention is emotionally difficult—for school personnel and MADOE. 
Consequently, issues of respect can complicate the process. For a Morwood teacher, a class visit 
proved disrespectful: “[S]omeone observed my class and I never even got a post-it note, like, ‘This is 
what I saw, thanks,’ or even introducing themselves. I tried to introduce myself once and I 
remember the woman saying, ‘You don’t need to know my name.’ I just thought it would be a 
courtesy.” A University teacher questioned the attitude MADOE personnel brought to the 
intervention:  
The state has given us these requirements that, while I think we’ve made a 
positive change in the school, I don’t think it has to be brought with such force. I 
think more of a constructive criticism would have been nice rather than finger-
pointing and blaming, accusatory almost, like, “Why aren’t your kids doing 
better? What is your teaching staff doing wrong?” 
While this teacher considered state intervention too accusatory, a Morwood teacher felt the 
intervention was too directive, and that the MADOE determined too much of what happened: 
[The reform plan has] too much emphasis on the fact that to be successful you 
have to use these methods and only these methods… That never works in 
education. You never say, “One-size fits all.” It would be better to have more 
                                                 
21 Although a number of teachers felt the MADOE had not been respectful, an August teacher felt 
differently: “I had the principal of a school. He was very complimentary after. He talked to me and I think 
because he was the principal he understood what the school went through and he empathized with us and 
said that he was not out to get us. He was there to gather information and it was, I felt, whatever he came up 
with was going to be an honest evaluation. They weren’t out to find the bad, but… to see that we really at 
that point were making an effort to change things around and I thought it was going to be a fair process.” 
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faith in the teachers knowing what the students need a lot of the times. Yes, 
observe and make suggestions, but there’s way too narrow a focus on how 
education has to be.  
For a University administrator respect was a comparative phenomenon: “I was at a meeting last 
year and I saw the reverence the DOE paid to some of the affluent districts, like Wellesley [a 
wealthy district]. But us, we do get treated differently. I don’t think [the MADOE] is even aware 
of the deference they give them, and the way they view and treat us.” 
Related concerns surfaced in the principal survey. Although 46% of respondents agreed that 
“the DOE values teacher input and opinions in the intervention process” (assuming this constitutes 
a form of respect), 41% disagreed (32%) or strongly disagreed (9%). In an open response, one 
principal addressed the issue directly: “The state needs to value the teachers that work under 
challenging circumstances. Let urban teachers know they are respected.”  
Though key to effective reform, according to our research various factors contributed to a 
lack of trust by both sides during state interventions (Bryk & Schneider, 2002; Evans, 1996).22 For 
schools, MADOE-required reports and documentation suggested a mistrust in their ability to meet 
expectations without oversight. For a Morwood teacher, the intervention process seemed less 
collaborative than anticipated, and implicitly less trusting: “What many people and I envisioned 
could have happened was that there’d be time to come together and work forward, not a top-down, 
‘We’re going to do these things,’ because there’s no buy-in.” In other cases trust suffered because of 
past experience with reform. As another Morwood teacher noted: 
 [W]e’ve restructured here before and now we’re restructuring again… We spent 
the same amount of time and energy and money breaking up into small learning 
communities and within a year that started to deteriorate… [T[hen we dismantled 
the bilingual program… It’s happened over and over and that’s why people don’t 
look to [state intervention] as the “joy of intervention.” With the Department of 
Education, I’m wondering, “Is this the same thing? Are we going to experience 
this revving up of interest and then they lose interest.”  
In one instance, mistrust was exacerbated by perceptions that MADOE colluded with the 
district. “I feel like the state… is totally in cahoots with the school district management,” said 
one practitioner.  
Concerns with trust also emerged in survey data. On the survey 96% of principals indicated 
that teacher buy-in was either essential (86%) or very important (9%) “to the effectiveness of 
MADOE intervention.” Yet when asked whether “the DOE values teacher input and opinions,” 
less than 50% agreed, although it seems MADOE could display trust and might enhance teacher 
buy-in by soliciting their input. Further, more than 80% of principals maintained that trust between 
school personnel and the DOE was either essential (27%) or very important (55%) to an effective 
intervention, and when principals rated how important it is for school personnel to trust that state 
“intervention [would] benefit their school”, all agreed that trust was either essential (64%) or very 
important (36%). However, when asked whether the MADOE “understands the challenges my 
school faces with serving our student population”—which is disproportionately non-native-English-
speaking and with high proportions qualifying for free/reduced price lunch—80% were either 
uncertain (27%), disagreed (36%) or strongly disagreed (9%). For principals to trust that intervention 
                                                 
22 Trust among teachers within a school can also be a concern, although our research did not 
examine this in-depth. As Bryk and Schneider (2002) maintained, “[T]eachers must work together to advance 
educational opportunities for children; but if teachers don’t trust their colleagues (which often is the case in 
schools most in need of reform), the required collaborative efforts are unlikely to be initiated and sustained” 
(p. 130). 
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will benefit their schools it seems MADOE needs to appreciate the challenges schools face. Yet 
principals clearly questioned whether MADOE understood those challenges, thereby suggesting that 
trust might be an issue as well.  
Time for Schools 
Reflecting on the emotional impact school reform has had on teacher lives, Robert Evans 
(1996) noted, “Of all the complaints of teachers about the difficulties of change programs in 
schools, none is more frequent than ‘not enough time’” (p. 139). This observation seems to hold 
true for state interventions. In MADOE panel reports on Morwood (2002b) and University (2002a), 
both teachers and administrators said they needed more time to do the work expected. In our 
qualitative studies, school personnel identified this need as well. As a University teacher explained, 
“Time is the biggest issue. Time with the students and time with colleagues to share, and time to do 
workshops because we have been training and we have to train others.” Drawing on similar 
thinking, a Morwood teacher said faculty never had time to collectively identify a direction for 
school reform:  
We never get any freed up time together, communication time together… [T]here 
was not a whole school movement toward getting out of this underperforming 
label… We need to do something together… [U]nless you get time to foster and 
talk about [reform] we can’t move that far with students… it’s very frustrating.  
Reflecting on the impact of state intervention teachers and administrators expressed a range of 
reactions. Some felt energized by the opportunity for reform. Others questioned the value of the 
intervention, even saying it had a negative impact. Respect and trust were matters of concern as 
was finding time to do the work to transform these schools. If nothing else, teacher and 
administrator views of state intervention point to the enormity of this challenge. 
Perceived Impact on Students 
When school personnel identified positive aspects of state intervention the benefits to 
students were often implicit in remarks such as, “We started to become aware of what makes better 
teachers,” and “teachers really had to get on the ball with their lesson plans,” which suggest that 
related benefits accrued to students in terms of enhanced achievement. The following section 
considers what teachers and principals said explicitly about how being in an underperforming school 
affected students.  
MCAS Preparation  
According to most research participants, because of their schools’ underperforming status, 
MCAS became a driving force behind the school curriculum, which narrowed accordingly, as 
teachers and administrators focused on state standards and preparing students for the exam 
(Shepard, 2001; Spreng, 2005). A Morwood administrator explained, “In every school there is 
emphasis on the MCAS. That’s all the teachers can emphasize. Because we are an underperforming 
school… teachers have to teach to the MCAS.” A Morwood teacher affirmed this view: “[T]he first 
day of school, the principal and chief academic officer said, ‘MCAS is our curriculum. ’” An August 
teacher stated, “There is absolutely an emphasis on MCAS… starting from September.” However, 
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the narrowing effects were more pronounced for teachers in the core MCAS content areas, some of 
whom adopted past MCAS exams as classroom curricula. In addition, two schools rearranged their 
schedules to maximize time devoted to MCAS content areas, math and English/language arts. This 
emphasis held true even at August Middle School which was not declared underperforming.  
Faculty also maintained that this curriculum shift influenced their teaching. As a Morwood 
teacher noted, “[Our students are] not being exposed to a wider knowledge base because we’re 
centered on just passing the test.” To a lesser degree, an August teacher also felt constrained:  
It has limited, not prohibited, [what I can do]… [Y]ou cannot leave this and go 
into something more challenging. [Some topics have] to be done… I used to do 
more challenging work because I could pick a concept and bring it to as high as 
the kids could reach. But now I cannot do that because it’ll take me time to build 
this up and I have other content that has to be covered and I’m thinking, “I 
cannot let them go to the test and not go through this.”  
For a University teacher, teaching to the test had drawbacks for students and teachers alike:  
Teaching to a test isn’t fun for the kids and isn’t fun for the teacher… [Y]ou’re so 
concerned with the test because you want to get the scores up and get [the state] 
off your back you lose track of what school is really about which is also teaching 
kids how to live in the real world with real skills, and you really can’t do that 
when you’re teaching to a test.  
In a related sense, a University teacher spoke to the dilemma she faced: helping students meet 
state standards while  trying to keep them from dropping out of school:  
[Y]ou have to keep teaching engaging, interactive, and fun, otherwise you lose 
sight of what’s important… These kids are most important to me. And [it’s 
critical that] these kids enjoy school and don’t lose their love for school right 
now because this is a crucial time. This is when they decide [about staying in 
school]. Some say, “I’m dropping out when I’m 16,” and if they decide that now, 
they’ll do it. 
In contrast, some school personnel saw substantial benefit to focusing on MCAS. As a 
University teacher noted: “I’d say students [have benefited] because we’ve improved our 
education, our instruction. We’ve focused more on things that they need more than what we 
think they need. We’ve looked at the data to see what they need to learn.” Moreover, an August 
administrator felt that preparing students for MCAS did not mean the curriculum had to narrow:  
Every opportunity we get, we talk to the kids about MCAS…. 
Do you think that in some ways it’s limited teachers’ ability to be more creative? 
No, because MCAS is not like the Stanford [9] where you can teach to the test…  
[I]t’s difficult to teach to the MCAS because it’s not a set of questions. MCAS is 
different and it asks kids to think critically. It asks them to compare and contrast, 
to analyze, to associate… It asks them questions about themselves, to connect 
themselves with past events… I think it’s a good data piece that you can say, 
“Hey this person’s able to think deeper.” 
Consistently, teachers and administrators who experienced state intervention acknowledged the 
related impact of MCAS preparation on curriculum and instruction. For some, it undermined 
student achievement and teacher autonomy. For others, a curriculum driven by MCAS 
represented an appropriate and valuable direction.  
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Distance from Responsibility for Student Failure  
In addition to emphasizing the MCAS as driving instruction, teacher responses indicate that 
the interventions may have created a wedge between teachers and student outcomes. Teachers 
expressed this insulation in several ways, from student misbehavior to the values that students and 
their families had. In discussing state intervention, many faculty maintained that student misbehavior 
was critical to their school’s underperforming status (Datnow, Borman, Stringfield, Overman, & 
Cartellano, 2003). Accordingly, a Morwood teacher challenged a perceived overemphasis on 
teachers: “I don’t think this is just a teacher problem… There’s no significant push to hold students 
accountable. No one asks what students need to do.” A second Morwood teacher had a similar 
reaction: “[F]or too many years… too much of the problems are blamed on teachers… [W]e have 
dozens and dozens of kids who never go to class… I write these students up and I get in touch with 
parents and nothing ever changes.” A third Morwood teacher felt students had “taken over” the 
school:  
[Students] are out of control. We say, “They’ve taken over”… I have a senior 
class and everyday I have four to five kids who show up on time out of 22… And 
we don’t seem to have an effective way of dealing with absenteeism and 
tardiness. It’s a total lack of order in the hallways… [L]oud talking, interrupting 
your class, opening your door and yelling, “Is this person here?” It’s chronic. It’s 
not a good atmosphere to learn…  
Would you say chaos is too strong a word to use to characterize this school? 
No… we may have two, three fire alarms on the same day… Wouldn’t you call 
that chaos?  
Teachers also questioned whether students valued education. An August teacher, for instance, 
alluded to students’ unwillingness to seek extra help:  
We have a program where kids can come after-school for extra help and they 
don’t stay and they’re not accountable for not staying. What do I do? … I don’t 
have any power to make them stay. How can you raise scores if the gaps they 
have can’t all be addressed during class time, yet they don’t show up for extra 
help? 
Implying a comparable perspective, a second August teacher reflected on student perceptions of 
the school’s underperforming label:  
I don’t remember the kids having it feel like a stigma. And unfortunately 
sometimes I think it’s because they don’t value education as much as we would 
hope…  [The attitude] is, “Let’s just get through it… All schools are alike, they’re 
like jails and they lock us down until 2:30 and then we’re free.” That’s their 
perception. 
A Morwood teacher said students attend her school precisely for its poor reputation:  
[I]f you were to ask them, “What’s the reputation of this school in relation to 
other schools?”, and I have asked them, they’ll come right out and say, “This is 
the easy school. This is the SPED school. This is the school where you can do 
anything and nothing will happen to you.” And there are kids who say, “I picked 
this school because of those reasons, because I really didn’t want to have to do 
any work.”  
Teachers also described problematic relationships with parents. A University teacher, for 
example, noted an ongoing lack of parent involvement:  
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Even after we were declared underperforming, it seems like it’s the same number 
of parents [who get involved]… We always invite all parents to discuss the plans, 
but most don’t come… [W]e call for a parent meeting when the kids aren’t 
coming [to school] or are cutting classes or just not doing any work… and 
generally they just won’t show up. 
An August teacher considered parents comparably uninvolved: “[Parent involvement] is getting 
better, but in general if I send warning notices for the child saying they’re failing, not passing in 
homework, no one gets back in touch with me. That tells me they’re not involved.”  
Commenting on expectations of student academic performance, a Morwood teacher 
questioned the attitude both students and parents brought to schooling:  
Expectations are very low from students themselves and their parents. You have 
parents who challenge you, who would take kids out of your class because the kid 
says it’s too hard. That happens all the time… [T]here are those kids who are 
satisfied with a C and their parents think that’s not too bad. I think expectations 
across the board are lacking.23 
Moreover, when asked whether in her opinion Morwood High was underperforming, a teacher’s 
response seems revealing: “I don’t think teachers in this building are underperforming at all. I 
think the teachers are fantastic, very hard-working.” An August teacher said her colleagues were 
professional: “I think the majority of [teachers]… are working very hard. Most of them are 
doing what is expected.” 
In these remarks, teachers offered various explanations for student failure and their school’s 
underperforming status, all of which distanced them somewhat from responsibility for these 
outcomes. Whether it was disregard and disrespect for learning that undermined classroom 
instruction, or students and parents whose expectations across the board are lacking, teachers 
identified factors that, from their perspectives, were beyond their control yet undermined student 
achievement (Datnow et al., 2003). 24  
Reinforcing Negative Stereotypes  
The final way in which teachers and administrators perceived their school’s underperforming 
status as affecting students is disheartening, though perhaps most pronounced at Morwood. In some 
educators’ views, this official designation affirmed a negative view of low-income, urban students of 
color. A Morwood administrator explained:  
Do you think students are aware of the fact that the school is underperforming? 
Yeah, they know. The MCAS scores are published in the paper before parents get 
it. The whole community gets to hear the school is this, the students are this and 
that. 
                                                 
23 Although in interviews teachers and administrators emphasized the role of parents in student 
achievement, as compared with teachers and administrators, principals rated parental support the least 
important of all elements in the success of state intervention. With the emphasis placed on that element in 
interviews, a mean of 2.5 on that survey question seems low. However, the survey was completed by 
principals only whereas most interviewees were teachers. Further, relative to other categories, such as teachers 
and principals, parents are likely not as important. Placed in this perspective, these results seem reasonable. 
24 Keirstead & Harvell (2005) identified similar developments in their study of four low-performing 
Massachusetts schools. However, at some schools state intervention helped them move from “discussions of 
‘them’ to discussions of ‘we’” (p. 7), which “provided a mantra for teams and schools to break their habits of 
blaming things beyond their control and taking responsibility for the things they could control” (pp. 7–8). 
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What’s their reaction?…  
They have gotten apathetic. They think, “We’re dummies, so we’ll act like 
dummies.”  
A Morwood teacher shared a similar view:  
Do you think students are aware that the school is underperforming? 
They’re aware of it; they’re more aware of it than anybody else. 
Do you think they have an opinion on it? 
Yeah, they have an opinion of it. They care about it. They know it’s not fair. 
They’re angry about it. They also seem resigned because they’re so used to it. 
They feel powerless… [M]y kids talk about it. They visit other schools and they 
come back and talk about how the classes are, what people have in other schools. 
They always make comparisons: “They have this, we don’t.” We have two 
computers and a printer in my classroom but none of them work. 
How is student morale? 
Student morale is just like the teachers’, it is low.  
A University administrator expressed a similar opinion:  
Some of the kids aren’t great students and when they’re labeled underperforming, 
that’s a hard thing for a kid.  
Do you think the students are or were aware that the school’s underperforming? 
Yes, they are. They’re aware.25 
 
Although students are the intended beneficiaries of state intervention, the benefits for them 
seem mixed. In some cases, intervention has led teachers to be more reflective about their work, to 
pay greater attention to lesson plans, and to mobilize around school improvement plans. The 
consequences of narrowing the curriculum is less obvious. Some teachers and administrators saw 
this as a positive development. Others felt constrained and consequently devoted less attention to 
engaging, interactive, and fun activities. Also, as teacher comments implied, students at 
underperforming schools were seen as a key piece of the problem by those who described them as 
“out of control,” “not want[ing] to have to do any work,” and “not valu[ing] education.” To further 
complicate the impact of state intervention on students, their schools are publicly identified as 
underperforming, a label that can be demoralizing for low-income students of color who already 
occupy a tenuous niche in American society and often have conflicted relationships with schools.  
Finally, students seem largely excluded from the intervention process. While MADOE 
reports focus on student performance in various academic domains, one hears virtually nothing 
from students about their performance—why they succeed or why they fail. Although the panel 
review process and fact-finding review allot time for two or three student focus groups, in the five 
reports on Morwood, University, and August posted on the MADOE website, there was direct 
input from students once, as the August report noted: “Students felt that the school was an orderly 
place and not violent and that the principal ‘knows how to handle situations’” (MADOE, 2001). The 
brevity and superficiality of this one sentence seems a symbolic statement on the student role in the 
intervention process.  
                                                 
25 In a few cases teachers said students were not aware of the “underperforming” label, typically 
explaining that this occurred because students cared little about their education. Therefore, while this 
designation may not impact their self-image, it suggests they hold a problematic view of education.  
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Policy Implications  
Building on what we learned about state intervention from teachers and administrators in 
our study schools, we offer a series of policy proposals aimed at helping state officials nationwide 
think about how to conceptualize and implement reform.  
Acknowledge the Challenge 
Given the novelty of the intervention process, the likelihood that mandated state 
interventions will increase, the limited staffing of many states departments of education, and the 
difficulty of turning around consistently low-performing schools (among other factors), those who 
control state budgets must recognize the enormity of this challenge, which means state education 
budgets must receive a significant infusion of financial resources. Without additional funding, state 
DOEs will not be able to provide the level of assistance and oversight necessary to help turn around 
low-performing schools, and state interventions will do little more than frustrate all involved in the 
process. The following policy implications are dependent on the DOE securing such financial 
support.  
Make the Process More Inclusive  
In interviews, most teachers and administrators acknowledged that their schools faced 
serious challenges and generally welcomed assistance. Many endorsed the overall approach to 
accountability promoted by MCAS, though not necessarily as the sole criterion of a school’s 
underperforming status. Overall, school personnel were clearly committed to improving their 
schools. However, they did question whether the State had the resources, technical expertise, or 
long-term commitment to address their needs. In our study sites, this initial skepticism tended to 
worsen when MADOE representatives had limited time to work with schools, as school personnel 
came to question whether the State fully understood their needs and, therefore, whether intervention 
strategies would benefit their schools. 
This troubling dynamic should be kept at the forefront of all efforts to aid consistently low-
performing schools for one overarching reason: student achievement will not improve unless a 
critical mass of school personnel actively embrace whatever reforms their schools undertake. As 
Fullan (2001) wrote, “Educational change depends on what teachers [and we would add, 
“administrators”] do and think—it’s as simple and complex as that” (p. 115). Understanding their 
point of view is therefore critical. To begin, while state interventions can be energizing, they are 
emotionally difficult (Evans, 1996; Hargreaves, 2004b). They start with the assumption that schools 
are failing, which as British educator Linda Turner (1998) observed, “appears to tell all of its staff 
that they also have failed” (p. 104). Further, those working in schools often feel powerless to change 
their predicament, believing “many factors that impact their work are outside their control” 
(Learmoth & Lowers, 1998, p. 133), although they are still held accountable for student 
achievement. In turn, issues of trust between school and state personnel often complicate this 
already difficult situation (Hoy & Tschannen-Moran, 2003).  
One means to address these tensions and build on the initial foundation of support for 
intervention is to bring teachers and administrators into the intervention process (Erlichson, 2005; 
Turner, 1998). Creating opportunities for school personnel to plan, deliberate, discuss, and disagree 
would allow them to shape reform, more fully understand what reform entails, and create a common 
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vision—all factors linked to successful intervention (Elmore, 2003; Erlichson, 2005; Rudo, 2001). 
An inclusive strategy could also promote mutual respect and trust between school and state 
personnel while using practitioner knowledge to shape a common school culture. In a very 
pragmatic way, if the opinions of teachers and principals were valued, DOEs might better 
understand the challenges faced by low-performing schools and thereby address them more 
effectively. Further, as such an approach will likely require DOE personnel to spend more time in 
school settings, there would be more opportunities to promote relational trust and respect, two key 
elements to successful reform (Bryk & Schneider, 2002). In addition, the student voice was nearly 
absent in the school intervention process. As these reforms ultimately aim to enhance student 
achievement, it seems the recipients of reform should have a meaningful role in the process, if only 
to let adults know how they feel about these endeavors (Corbett & Wilson, 1995; Fullan & 
Stiegelbauer, 1991; Learmoth & Lowers, 1998).  Otherwise, any effort at change is “based on an 
incomplete picture of life in classrooms and schools” (Cook-Sather, 2002, p. 3).  
As states continue conducting interventions, which we consider appropriate and potentially 
quite valuable, it seems the process could promote mutual respect, trust, and understanding by more 
fully integrating the student, teacher, and administrator points of view. If they are to enact reform, it 
seems reasonable to allow them opportunities to shape reform. In so doing, state departments of 
education must always make student achievement their  highest priority. Indeed, state personnel 
should make this point explicit at the outset of any intervention and maintain an unrelenting 
commitment to this overarching ideal throughout, even while they seek to honor the opinions of 
teachers and administrators.  
Level the Playing Field  
To further enhance their relations with school personnel, state officials could reassess their 
approach to accountability. As noted many times, teachers in underperforming schools in 
Massachusetts said they faced an unfair disadvantage, largely because of the MCAS exam. Holding 
all students to the same standards does not feel equitable to teachers who work with sizable 
numbers of highly mobile, low-income, ELL, and special needs students. It seems no coincidence 
that every school reviewed as potentially underperforming enrolled disproportionate numbers of 
these students. Why should these schools and teachers be more likely to face public stigma? All 
involved would benefit from a more sensitive testing instrument that followed individual student 
progress, or at least followed cohorts over time, rather than treating each student cohort as equal. 
They are not,  and to treat them as such and then publicly identify   them as underperforming can 
make teachers and students in these schools feel that they are unwilling participants in a rigged 
game.  
States might also promote more productive relations with school personnel by explicitly 
identifying the standards by which schools are judged. Since those schools declared 
underperforming in our study and those that experienced panel review but avoided the official label 
often differed little in terms of MCAS performance, vague evaluation criteria could distract school 
personnel with issues of equity while undermining trust and contributing little to school 
improvement. In this regard, consider how a Morwood administrator reacted to being declared 
underperforming:26  
                                                 
26 Of the interviews, this was the only principal who was at his school when it was declared 
‘underperforming.’ The others assumed their position after the school was labeled.  
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I felt rage. Built up rage… I knew scores were low across the city. Before I 
actually set foot here, I was given a clear message on what needed to happen 
once I was selected as principal. [But] I had not had time to implement any of my 
agenda. When I heard about this, I called the superintendent and asked him, 
“Why? What was going on? Why us? We’re in the middle of the pack, and others 
fared much worse in terms of MCAS?”… [T]he school had begun to make 
improvement and we were starting to address structural and instructional issues 
to improve student performance. All that didn’t matter. It was basically, “You’re 
selected, and this is it.”  
Such anger, resentment, and frustration—fueled in part by vague evaluation criteria—creates a 
difficult environment within which to begin the intervention process.  
Directions for Future Research 
Future research on state intervention in low-performing schools should make student 
achievement a priority. As state interventions will only increase, there is a need for longitudinal 
quantitative studies with a larger study population than ours to determine any correlation between 
being declared underperforming with increases in student performance. This would entail assessing 
the trajectory of schools designated underperforming with those that were not, to determine what 
effect, if any, state intervention had and how much of any improvement can be attributed to 
intervention. Such research should be complemented by qualitative investigations that explore the 
mechanisms of change, the “how” and “why” behind the outcomes at underperforming schools. 
Many participants in our study reported changes in school schedules and curricula to maximize time 
spent preparing for state exams. Others feared that overemphasis of math and English/Language 
Arts may contribute to students dropping out. The proposed studies could begin to examine these as 
well as other important issues.  
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Appendix A 
 
Teacher and Administrator Interview Questions 
Although all interviewees were asked the questions below, as other topics and issues 
emerged they were explored to the extent possible. Most interviews lasted between 45 and 70 
minutes. 
 
1) Can you recall how you felt, what your thoughts were, when you learned that your school 
would be reviewed for being potentially underperforming? 
2) Can you share with me what that process was like and has been for you as a teacher and 
for the school? 
3) Is there anyone or group, in particular, that you think this process has or did affect the 
most? 
4) Do you think the school’s designation as underperforming is a reflection of yourself and 
your work; or a reflection of your peers? 
5) Having gone through this process, what are your thoughts on state intervention in 
schools? 
6) Do you think others view you or your school differently? 
7) Having gone through this process, what is your view on state intervention in schools? 
8) Whom do you think should be held accountable for student performance? 
9) Is there an emphasis on the MCAS at your school? 
10) What is your opinion of that emphasis or lack thereof? 
11) What is your opinion of the MCAS as the primary measure of your performance as a 
teacher? 
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